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OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Before us is the fallout of a public feud principally among former Pennsylvania 
officials.  Plaintiffs were three prosecutors in Pennsylvania’s Office of Attorney General 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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(Richard A. Sheetz, Jr., E. Marc Costanzo, and Frank Fina), an investigator (Randy P. 
Feathers), and the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police (Frank Noonan).  They 
sue former Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane and a current investigator in 
the AG’s Office, Michael Miletto, for retaliating against them after exercising their First 
Amendment rights to speak out against Kane.  The District Court dismissed their claims 
essentially for failing to allege that the retaliatory acts were accompanied by threats.  
Because Plaintiffs have adequately pled unlawful retaliatory conduct in this context, we 
reverse. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 In November 2012, Kane was elected Attorney General of Pennsylvania.  During 
her campaign, she was highly critical of her predecessor and the Office of Attorney 
General for their handling of the investigation of Jerry Sandusky, the former Penn State 
assistant football coach who was eventually convicted of sexually abusing minors.  On 
the campaign trail, Kane accused the AG’s Office of delaying the investigation for 
political reasons and allocating insufficient resources to it.  She pledged, if elected, to 
conduct her own investigation into that Office’s purported mishandling of the Sandusky 
investigation that involved each Plaintiff.  Feathers publicly challenged Kane’s 
allegations and called her uninformed. 
 Once in office, Kane assumed oversight of another investigation in which 
Plaintiffs had been involved.  It concerned elected Philadelphia public officials who were 
suspected of taking bribes in exchange for votes and influence.  An informant, Tyron Ali, 
assisted investigators in exchange for the dropping of separate criminal charges against 
4 
 
him.  When Kane took control of the investigation, Fina discovered that she had a 
conflict of interest and brought it to her attention.  Kane disregarded Fina’s concerns, 
decided to maintain control of the matter, declined to prosecute it, and refused to honor 
the plea agreement with Ali.  Only after Fina disclosed to the supervising court Kane’s 
conflict of interest in the investigation did she agree to drop the charges against Ali. 
 Following this dispute, Kane began making public accusations about the Ali 
bribery investigation, challenging that it lacked quality, was flawed, and was not 
prosecutable.  She also stated that the entire investigation was racially motivated, as only 
members of the General Assembly’s Black Caucus were targeted.  Plaintiffs allege that 
Kane made these public accusations to damage the reputation of those involved in the 
investigation.  They made public statements refuting Kane’s accusations, and the 
Philadelphia District Attorney ultimately concluded that her statements were false. 
 Amidst this growing battle between Kane and Plaintiffs, she came across a 2009 
investigation conducted in part by Fina and Costanzo.  The AG’s Office had been 
investigating J. Whyatt Mondesire, the former head of the Philadelphia chapter of the 
NAACP, and suspected that state grant money was improperly used to make payments to 
him.  Due to the unavailability of witness testimony, that investigation came to a 
standstill.  On learning of the stalled inquiry, Kane retrieved confidential grand jury 
documents relating to it and, through an associate of hers, transferred those materials to a 
reporter who wrote a story suggesting that Fina and Costanzo had obstructed or otherwise 
improperly terminated the investigation.  Plaintiffs allege that this story was written at 
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Kane’s instruction.1  They also allege that Kane conspired with Co-Defendant Miletto by 
directing him to fabricate a story that he uncovered evidence of Mondesire’s wrongdoing 
but that Fina and Costanzo removed him from the investigation when told of his 
discovery.  
 After learning of the release of the grand jury documents, Fina and Costanzo 
alerted the grand jury’s supervising judge in the Mondesire investigation of the leak.2  A 
separate investigation ensued, and both Fina and Costanzo testified before the grand jury.  
On the day they were scheduled to testify, they allege that Miletto and other agents in the 
AG’s Office met them as they arrived, made threatening and harassing statements and 
attempted physically to intimidate them.  Following this incident, the supervising judge 
imposed a protective order preventing any further attempted intimidation. 
 While the grand jury leak investigation was ongoing, Kane decided to make good 
on her campaign pledge to investigate the handling of the Sandusky investigation.  
Geoffrey Moulton, the attorney in the AG’s Office directing the inquiry, completed his 
report of that investigation and, per the supervising judge’s protocol, provided a copy of 
it to Fina, Noonan, Sheetz, and Feathers so that they would have the opportunity to 
respond.  They did so, criticizing its findings and Kane’s motives, and these responses 
were included in the report.  Battling press conferences followed its public release.  Kane 
                                              
 1 Plaintiffs also named as defendants on this claim the reporter, Philadelphia Daily 
News, Philadelphia Media Network, LLC, and Philadelphia Media Network (Digital), 
LLC, but they were dismissed by party stipulation.  
 
 2  The Commonwealth later indicted Kane for unlawfully disclosing grand jury 
materials and committing perjury before a grand jury.  She was convicted of these 
charges in October 2016.   
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declared that the delay in the investigation provided Sandusky the opportunity to sexually 
assault other minors; Plaintiffs countered that these allegations were untrue, Kane knew 
they were untrue, and she was sensationalizing the series of events for the sole purpose of 
delivering on her campaign promises.  Kane later conceded that her accusations were 
false.  
 Their public combat continued to escalate.  Following Moulton’s report, Kane 
came across a deluge of emails sent among the AG’s Office officials—on government 
email accounts—in connection with the Sandusky investigation that were pornographic in 
nature and contained images of children.  Plaintiffs were included on these email chains.  
On two separate occasions, Kane’s subordinates allegedly threatened Fina’s colleagues 
that she would release those emails in a manner damaging to Plaintiffs if they did not stop 
publicly criticizing her regarding the grand jury leak in the Mondesire investigation.  See 
J.A. at 177 (Plaintiffs “are going to be hurt if Fina does not back off.” (quotations 
omitted)); (Fina’s colleague was instructed to warn “Fina that if [he] did not stop 
criticizing Kane, [she] would release the private emails of the former [AG’s Office] 
staff.”).  Although Kane was advised that she could not lawfully release these emails in a 
selective manner and a Commonwealth court informed her that the emails were not 
subject to public release under Pennsylvania law, she released them nonetheless.  
Plaintiffs allege that she selectively released only some of the emails to paint them in a 
false light and depict them as the primary participants in the distribution of offensive 
email content.  During an interview with Kane broadcast nationally, she chastised those 
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involved in the email scandal and insinuated that they disseminated child pornography 
via government email accounts.  These insinuations were false. 
 Plaintiffs brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Kane and Miletto 
unlawfully retaliated against them for exercising their First Amendment rights to speak 
out against Kane.  They brought six federal counts: I) retaliation regarding accusations of 
Plaintiffs’ racial bias in the Ali bribery investigation; II) retaliation regarding Plaintiffs’ 
impeding the Mondesire investigation and releasing associated confidential grand jury 
documents;  III) conspiracy to retaliate regarding the Mondesire investigation; IV) 
retaliation regarding Plaintiffs’ delay in the Sandusky investigation and Moulton’s report 
on it; V) retaliation regarding Plaintiffs’ emails in the Sandusky investigation and 
insinuations that they were distributing child pornography; and VI) retaliation and casting 
false light on Plaintiffs in selectively releasing those emails.  They also brought two state-
law defamation claims.   
 The District Court dismissed all First Amendment retaliation claims under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and then, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over the Pennsylvania law claims, dismissed them without prejudice so that they could be 
brought in state court.  The District Court did not reach Defendants’ argument that they 
are entitled to qualified immunity.  This appeal follows.   
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
  We have jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review without deference a 
district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
for failure to state a claim.  Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).  When 
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conducting our review, “we must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, [but] are 
not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal 
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”  Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quotation omitted).  “We first take note of the elements a plaintiff 
must plead to state a claim” and then, assuming “the veracity of well-pleaded factual 
allegations[,] . . . determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”  
Saliba v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 828 F.3d 182, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotations 
omitted).    
III.  ANALYSIS 
 A.  First Amendment Claims 
 “In order to plead a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must 
allege: (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a 
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link 
between the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.”  Thomas v. 
Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  It “is a fact 
intensive inquiry focusing on the status of the speaker, the status of the retaliator, the 
relationship between the speaker and retaliator, and the nature of the retaliatory acts.”  
Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 419 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation and emphases omitted). 3   
                                              
 3 In their briefing, Kane and Miletto suggest that Plaintiffs were never employees 
for the purpose of their First Amendment retaliation claims and thus a different legal 
analysis would apply.  Appellees’ Br. at 20.  Not only do they concede that Plaintiffs 
might have been employees under Kane, see, e.g., id. at 27 (Plaintiffs “left the [AG’s 
Office] shortly before or after [Kane’s] inauguration”), and cite to First Amendment 
retaliation cases in which the plaintiff was an employee, the District Court expressly 
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The “key question” is the second element—whether the action would sufficiently deter 
the exercise of constitutional rights.  McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006).  
An official’s retaliatory action “need not be great in order to be actionable,” but it must 
be more than de minimus.  Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(quotation omitted).  “On the other hand, . . . where the [official’s] alleged retaliatory acts 
were criticism, false accusations, or verbal reprimands,” a First Amendment retaliation 
claim typically does not exist.  Brennan, 350 F.3d at 419 (quotation omitted).  
 As the District Court observed and the parties agree, Plaintiffs have satisfied the 
first and last elements of their retaliation claims—Plaintiffs were engaged in conduct 
protected by the First Amendment and there is a causal link between that conduct and the 
alleged retaliatory action.  Kane and Miletto argue, however, that Plaintiffs have not 
sufficiently claimed any retaliatory action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness 
from engaging in the protected conduct.  The District Court agreed, finding that Plaintiffs 
had not met this required element because they did not allege any threats or intimidation.  
We disagree.  
 The District Court correctly determined that “where a public official’s alleged 
retaliation is in the nature of speech, in the absence of a threat, coercion, or intimidation 
intimating that punishment, sanction, or adverse regulatory action will  immediately 
follow, such speech does not adversely affect a citizen’s First Amendment rights, even if 
                                                                                                                                                  
declined to make such a finding given Plaintiffs’ pleadings, J.A. at 48.  Our reading of 
paragraphs 35 through 61 of the Complaint is that Costanzo likely left the AG’s Office 
prior to Kane’s inauguration, and the employee status of the remaining Plaintiffs remains 
ambiguous.  This is fact-finding that the District Court should make in the first instance.  
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defamatory.”  J.A. at 64 (quoting Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 687 (4th 
Cir. 2000)).  This is so because, “when a public official’s allegedly retaliatory acts are in 
the form of speech, the official’s own First Amendment speech rights are implicated.”  
Zaloga v. Borough of Moosic, 841 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted).  
Because each party has a First Amendment interest in those circumstances, “we employ a 
more specific test to determine whether the official’s speech amounts to a retaliatory 
act”—that outlined in Suarez.  Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 651 (3d Cir. 2017).  
As noted, normally “an [official’s] actions have [not] adversely affected [the] exercise of 
[] First Amendment rights where the [] alleged retaliatory acts were criticism, false 
accusations, or verbal reprimands.”  McKee, 436 F.3d at 170 (quoting Brennan, 350 F.3d 
at 419 (quotation omitted)).  However, a retaliation claim involving a government 
official’s own speech must involve a “threat, coercion, or intimidation” by the official 
that a punishment will follow from the continued exercise of a plaintiff’s First 
Amendment rights.  Mirabella, 853 F.3d at 651 (quotation omitted).  See also Koren v. 
Noonan, 586 F. App’x 885, 888 (3d Cir. 2014); Mun. Revenue Servs., Inc. v. McBlain, 
347 F. App’x 817, 825 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 With this understanding—that to survive a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs must allege 
retaliation by Defendants accompanied by coercion, threats, or intimidation—they have 
sufficiently pled as much in their first amended complaint.  They assert at least three 
specific instances in which Defendants (or associates at their direction) threatened them.  
Fina alleges that his colleague was told by Kane’s deputy that “if Fina did not stop 
criticizing Kane, [she] would release the private emails of the former [AG’s Office] 
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staff.”  J.A. at 177.  In another encounter between Fina’s colleague and Kane’s 
subordinate, Fina alleges that Kane’s staff threatened that “a lot of [Fina’s] people are 
going to be hurt if ‘Fina does not back off.’”  Id.  Although the District Court did not 
believe Plaintiffs alleged that these threats came directly from Kane, they do in fact make 
such an allegation.  Id. at 175; see also id. at 222 (“Each of the Plaintiffs was subject to 
direct attempts of intimidation and blackmail by the Defendant Kane, as she threatened 
that if the Plaintiffs continued to be publicly critical of her, she would selectively release 
damaging and embarrassing information in an attempt to humiliate and impugn them.”).  
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Miletto physically threatened and intimidated them at the 
courthouse where they were about to testify against him regarding the grand jury leak, 
which lead to the court issuing a protective order against him.  Id. at 172.  These 
constitute threats of adverse action or punishment that would follow if Plaintiffs 
continued to exercise their First Amendment right to speak out against Kane. 4   
 No doubt facts found in discovery will make or break Plaintiffs’ case.  But at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage they have alleged a colorable claim of retaliation in violation of 
their First Amendment rights.  Whether that retaliation would deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from exercising those rights is a question to be decided by the factfinder and not 
discarded so early.  Accordingly, we reverse.   
                                              
 4 In passing, Plaintiffs assert that we must apply an objective standard to their 
claims, presumably because their allegations indicate that they were not in fact chilled 
from exercising their First Amendment rights and continued to make public statements 
against Kane following the alleged threats made in attempt to silence them.  Plaintiffs are 
correct that an objective standard is applied and that they need not allege actual 
deterrence to state a First Amendment retaliation claim.  See Mirabella, 853 F.3d at 650.  
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 B.  Qualified Immunity 
 Defendants ask us to grant them qualified immunity should we find that Plaintiffs 
allege an actionable First Amendment retaliation claim.  In response, Plaintiffs argue that 
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when they knowingly violate the law, 
as they acted deliberately to retaliate against Plaintiffs and committed unlawful acts in 
doing so (such as releasing confidential grand jury documents).  Moreover, Plaintiffs 
point out that Kane had two legal opinions advising her of the illegality of releasing 
Plaintiffs’ emails, and Kane herself actively challenged the release of them in court when 
requested by journalists under Pennsylvania law.  Because the District Court did not 
reach Defendants’ arguments that they are entitled to qualified immunity, it is premature 
to consider it in the first instance.  
* * * * * 
 Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled claims of retaliation against government officials 
in violation of their First Amendment rights.  Thus we reverse and remand so that they 
can proceed to discovery. 
